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My first contact with language acquisition research and Elena was as a HiWi (student 
assistant in Germany) at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in 
Leipzig. Together with other students from the University of Leipzig, I was 
transcribing and coding child-caregiver interactions in German, which were mainly 
about trains (der Rasende Roland) and some old German buildings (die Frauenkirche 
in Dresden). These interactions are now publicly available in the Leo corpus on 
CHILDES (MacWhinney, 2000). Our open-plan HiWi office was situated right 
between Elena’s and Mike Tomasello’s offices. They usually had their doors open 
and did not get up from their desks to talk to teach other. What all of us HiWi’s were 
soon impressed by was Elena’s strong and loud voice, which led us to call her The 
Voice.  
 
Later, as a PhD student, I’ve learned that Elena also uses her strong and loud voice to 
ask questions without a microphone after conference talks. And I’ve learned that 
Elena uses her voice to support early career researchers. At the Max Planck Institute, 
we could really see that both Elena and Mike were much more interested in what 
questions and ideas people were asking and developing than in who was asking those 
questions or developing those ideas (an established professor or a student intern). 
Finally, I’ve also learned that Elena herself never stops using her voice to ask new, 




Language acquisition and Theory of Mind in interaction 
 
In order to communicate successfully, children - and adults - have to understand that 
their interlocutors can have attitudes, perspectives, beliefs, and knowledge states that 
differ from their own. One of the most commonly used tasks to test children’s 
understanding of other people’s beliefs and knowledge states is the Change of 
Location test, where a story character has a false belief (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In 
this false belief test, children typically hear and see the following kind of story:  
 
“Maxi puts his marble into a basket. Then he goes out to play in the park. 
While he is out to play, his sister Sally takes the marble out of the basket and 
puts it into a box. Then Sally also goes out to play. When Maxi comes back 
from the park, he wants to play with his marble”.  
 
After the story children get asked the crucial test question:  
 
“Where will Maxi look for his marble - in the basket or in the box?”  
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In order to make sure that children have followed the story, they also get asked two 
control questions:  
 
“Where is the marble really now?”  
“And where did Maxi put the marble in the beginning?“ 
 
At around the age of four years, children typically start to give the correct answer to 
the test question (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). In order to give the right answer, 
children have to be able to distinguish between the character’s false belief (i.e. that 
the marble is still in the basket) and their own knowledge of the actual location of the 
marble (i.e. that the marble is really in the box now). They also have to inhibit an 
egocentric response, which would be based on their own representation of the 
situation (i.e. that they would look in the box because that’s the current location of the 
marble).  
Interestingly, deaf children who grow up with hearing parents and thus have 
no access to a sign language at home are delayed in their understanding of false 
belief. Importantly, however, deaf children who grow up with deaf parents and are 
exposed to a sign language from early on develop an understanding of false belief on 
the same time scale as hearing children growing up with hearing parents and a spoken 
language (Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers, & Hoffmeister, 2007).  
In addition, there is some evidence suggesting that even adults who have not 
acquired a fully developed language can struggle with false belief tests. Pyers and 
Senghas (2009) investigated false belief understanding in adults and adolescents who 
have developed Nicaraguan Sign Language. This sign language has only started to 
develop in the late 1970’s when deaf children in Nicaragua first came together in a 
newly established school for the deaf. Before this school had been established, these 
children did not have much contact with other deaf individuals and were mainly 
communicating with their hearing caregivers by using home signs. Even though home 
signs share some features with fully developed sign languages and spoken languages, 
they also lack a number of grammatical and semantic features (e.g., Senghas & 
Coppola, 2001). When these home signers came together in the new school, children 
in the first cohort started to develop a simple version of Nicaraguan Sign Language. 
Children in the second cohort learned this developing sign language from the first 
cohort and developed it further into a more complex language with more grammatical 
and semantic features. Children from both the first and second cohorts are adults now. 
When first tested on their linguistic skills and false belief understanding in 2001, 
adults and adolescents from the second cohort produced significantly more mental 
verbs (e.g., know, think) than the first cohort. Adults and adolescents from the second 
cohort also outperformed the first cohort on a low-verbal version of the Change of 
Location false belief test described above. On average, adults from the first cohort 
passed fewer than one out of four false belief tests, whereas most individuals from the 
second cohort passed all four.  
Taken together, these data from deaf children as well as adults and adolescents 
can be taken as clear evidence that having access to a fully developed sign language 
supports the understanding of others’ beliefs. Similarly, a large number of studies 
with hearing children have found strong relationships between children’s linguistic 
skills and their false belief understanding, and most of them suggest that language 
precedes false belief (see meta analyses by Farrar, Benigno, Tompkins, and Gage, 




Interactions between syntax, verbal semantics and false belief 
 
However, it is far from clear how exactly language supports false belief. Some 
researchers suggest that just taking part in everyday conversation makes children 
aware of the fact that people can differ in their beliefs, knowledge states, attitudes, 
and perspectives (e.g., Harris, de Rosnay, & Pons, 2005). For example, the use of 
alternative labels (e.g., rabbit vs. bunny; coast vs. shore; aunt vs. mother) already 
points to different perspectives on and mental representations of the same object, 
scene, or person. In accordance with this approach, Perner, Stummer, Sprung, and 
Doherty (2002) could show that children’s increasing ability to produce and 
comprehend alternative labels developed in parallel with their increasing 
understanding of false belief. Similarly, Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) found in 
their training study that simply talking about deceptive objects, such as candles 
looking like apples, promotes children’s false belief understanding. That is, children 
who experienced these deceptive objects together with utterances such as “right, it 
really is a candle” improved in their false belief understanding. On the other hand, 
children who only heard minimal language (e.g., “and now look”) did not show any 
advances in their understanding of others’ beliefs. In another training study, Lu, Su, 
and Wang (2008) were able to show that encouraging children to just talk about other 
people’s actions can also lead to improved false belief understanding. As stated by 
Harris et al. (2005, p. 72), any linguistic expression that points to individual and 
others’ perspectives promotes Theory of Mind. The assumption that an exposure to 
general language promotes children’s false belief understanding is further supported 
by a great number of studies finding correlations and longitudinal links between 
children’ performance on standardized tests of grammar and vocabulary and their 
false belief understanding (e.g., Cheung et al., 2004; Farrar & Maag, 2002; Tardif, So, 
& Kaciroti, 2007).  
Others, however, argue that it is caregivers’ use of specific mental verbs, such 
as think and know, that points children to different beliefs and knowledge states. For 
example, Ruffman, Slade, and Crowe (2002) found that the frequency of mental state 
verbs in mothers’ language was positively correlated with their children’s false belief 
understanding later on.  
Yet another suggestion is that learning complex syntactic structures provides 
children with a tool that allows them to represent different beliefs (e.g., Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999). Related to this last point, de Villiers and colleagues (e.g., de Villiers 
& Pyers, 2002) have argued that only specific syntactic structures, namely 
complement clause structures, allow children to represent and develop an 
understanding of false belief. More precisely, complement clause structures (e.g., “I 
know that the marble is in the box now” and “Maxi thinks that the marble is still in 
the basket”) allow us to talk about and represent the same situation from different 
mental perspectives – in an explicit and flexible manner.  
Teasing apart the different linguistic factors can be difficult. For example, 
mental verbs and complement clause constructions are used and processed in and 
cannot be taken out of everyday conversation. Similarly, mental verbs like know and 
think are often used in complement clause structures (e.g., “Maxi thinks that the 
marble is still in the basket”). There is some evidence, however, that complement 
clause constructions are also positively related to children’s false belief understanding 
when they are used without mental verbs. That is, children’s understanding of 
complement clause constructions with communication verbs (e.g., “Maxi said that the 
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marble is still in the basket”) also predicts their false belief understanding (e.g., de 
Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). This led de Villiers and Pyers 
(2002) to argue that it is the syntax, not the semantics, of complement clause 
constructions that promotes children’s false belief development. 
However, when turning to languages that allow an even greater variety of verb 
types to be used in complement clause structures, the pictures looks a bit different. In 
German, for example, it is also common and grammatical to use desire verbs together 
with finite complement clauses:  
 
(1) Maxi  will,  dass die Murmel in dem Korb ist. 
Maxi  wants  that  the  marble  in the basket is. 
‘Maxi wants the marble to be in the basket’ 
 
(2) Maxi denkt, dass die  Murmel in dem Korb ist. 
 Maxi thinks that  the marble  in the basket is 
 ‘Max thinks that the marble is in the basket. 
 
 
When Perner, Sprung, Zauner, and Haider (2003) looked at German-speaking 
children’s comprehension of complement clause structures used with different kinds 
of verbs, they found that children understood complement clause structures with 
desire verbs like will ‘want’ (see example (1)) before they understood the same clause 
types with communication and mental verbs like denken ‘think’ (see example (2)). In 
addition, children’s understanding of complement clause structures with desire verbs 
was not related to their understanding of false belief.  
This led de Villiers (2005) to refine her hypothesis and suggest that it is only 
realis complements that allow children to acquire an understanding of false belief. 
The crucial feature of a realis complement, such as (2) above, is that they refer to a 
mental representations of a situation in the past or present (e.g., that the marble is or 
was in the basket). This mental representation can be true or false. In this example, 
the marble could or could not be in the basket. When used with desire verbs like want, 
however, complements are irrealis. They refer to representations of future or 
hypothetical events. The superordinate proposition (e.g., “Maxi wants”) does not 
occur at the same time as the subordinate proposition (“that the marble be in the 
basket”).  
This research suggests that we might not be able to disentangle the semantic 
and syntactic features of complement clause constructions as both seem to play a 
crucial role in supporting children’s ability to learn and understand false belief. 
Another line of research suggests that we should also consider multiple linguistic 
routes to false belief. As mentioned above, several training and longitudinal studies 
have found that children’s understanding of and their exposure to complement clause 
structures predicts and facilitates their understanding of false belief (e.g., de Villiers 
& Pyers, 2002; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). However, Lohmann and Tomasello 
(2003) also found that exposing children to simple language also leads to better false 
belief understanding later on. Interestingly, the results from a recent meta analysis and 
qualitative review suggest that there might also be differences between typically 
developing children and children with autism when it comes to choosing which 
linguistic route best supports false belief. Farrar and colleagues (2017) suggest that 
typically developing children might actually rely most on their general linguistic 
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skills, including simple language, whereas children with autism mostly benefit from 
acquiring the complex structure of complement clauses. 
 
 
Interactions between syntax, verbal semantics and false belief from a cross-linguistic 
perspective 
 
What I will discuss in more detail in the remainder of this chapter is that the choice of 
linguistic route to false belief can also be affected by cross-linguistic differences. In 
particular, I will argue that how different types of complement clauses facilitate 
children’s false belief understanding depends on how these syntactic constructions are 
used in a given language. As summarized above, de Villiers (2005) suggested that, in 
languages such as English and German, complement clauses only support children’s 
false belief development when they are of the realis type. Realis complement clauses 
can be used together with communication and mental verbs like say, think and know, 
but not with desire verbs like want.  
For Chinese, however, Cheung, Chen, and Yeung (2009) proposed another 
type of modification. Unlike English and German, both Cantonese and Mandarin 
Chinese have a mental verb that explicitly encodes false belief. The Cantonese verb 
ji5wai4 (yi3wei2 in Mandarin) can be translated as ‘falsely think’. When Cheung et al. 
(2009) tested Cantonese children’s understanding of complement clause constructions 
and how they are related to false belief, they found that only the understanding of 
complement clauses used together with this explicit false belief verb was positively 
correlated with children’s false belief understanding. Cantonese children’s 
understanding of complement clauses used together with communication or neutral 
mental verbs (e.g., ‘say’ or ‘think’) played no unique role in predicting children’s 
false belief understanding. In other words, the link between false belief and 
complement clause structures interacts with the realis vs. irrealis distinction in 
English and German, with only realis complement clauses showing a positive relation 
to false belief (e.g., de Villiers, 2005). In Cantonese Chinese, however, the positive 
relation between false belief and complement clause structures interacts with the 
distinction between explicit false belief verbs vs. any other mental or communication 
verb used in the complement clause construction.  
In a recent study, we were able to replicate this finding for Mandarin and 
Cantonese Chinese using different linguistic tasks than the ones used by Cheung et al. 
(2009) (Brandt, Li, & Chan, in prep.). Unlike Cheung et al. (2009), who used different 
tasks for complement clause constructions with ‘falsely think’ and complement clause 
constructions with other mental and communication verbs, we tested the 
understanding of complement clause constructions with different verb types within 
the same task. We used the hidden object task by Moore, Bryant, and Furrow (1989), 
where children hear contrastive statements, such as: “I think that the sticker is in the 
blue box” vs. “I know that the sticker is in the red box”. In order to pass this task, 
children need to understand that the proposition marked by know is more trustworthy 
than the proposition marked by think. When testing Chinese children, we contrasted 
‘know’ vs. ‘think’ and ‘know’ vs. ‘falsely think’. We found that Chinese children’s 
performance in this hidden object task also correlate with their false belief 
understanding. However, regression analyses suggest that it is only the contrast 
between ‘know’ vs. ‘falsely think’ that is uniquely related to false belief (see Brandt, 




Looking at usage patterns and functions across languages 
 
Turning back to English and German, several studies suggest that not just the choice 
of a specific verb type, but also the choice of a specific subject type can lead to 
differences in children’s interpretation of complement clause constructions and how 
they are related to their false belief understanding. As shown by Brandt, Buttelmann, 
Lieven, and Tomasello (2016), English-speaking children understand complement 
clause construction with third person subjects in the main clause (e.g., “he knows that 
the sticker is in the blue box”) better than complement clause constructions with first 
person subjects in the main clause (e.g., “I know that the sticker is in the blue box”). 
To save some words, I will refer to these two constructions as third and first person 
complements from here on. Brandt et al. (2016) also found that children’s 
understanding of third person complements was more strongly related to their false 
belief understanding than their understanding of first person complements (for similar 
results in English see Howard Gola, 2012). Similar patterns were found for German-
speaking 3- and 4-year-olds (Brandt & Buttelmann, 2015).  
 We have recently replicated this finding in a more carefully designed 
longitudinal study with English-speaking 3-year-olds, where we also tested and 
controlled for children’s general linguistic skills and a number of additional individual 
difference measures (Boeg Thomsen, Theakston, Kandemirci, & Brandt, in prep.). As 
has been shown for general linguistic skills (e.g., Cheung et al., 2004; Farrar & Maag, 
2002), children’s executive functioning skills also seem to be positively related to 
false belief understanding (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002). As shortly 
mentioned before, children have to inhibit their own knowledge state and their access 
to reality when answering the test question in a false belief test. And since they have 
to remember the story, their general memory skills might also affect their 
performance in these Theory of Mind tests (e.g., Davis & Pratt, 1995). Therefore, 
when children first came into the lab for this longitudinal study around the age of 
three years, we did not just test their understanding of complement clause 
constructions, we also assessed their understanding of vocabulary and grammar, their 
inhibitory control, as well as their short term and working memory. Another 
methodological improvement in this longitudinal study was that we avoided using any 
complement clause constructions in the false belief test questions. In previous 
longitudinal studies, some of the false belief test questions contained the same 
linguistic structures and verbs as the ones used for testing children’s understanding of 
complement clauses. For example, de Villiers and Pyers (2002) used sentences like 
“what did she think she bought” when testing children on their understanding of 
complement clause structures. And they used highly similar sentences like “what did 
you think was in the box” when testing their understanding of false belief. It is thus 
not clear whether children’s performance in the false belief test was measured 
independently of their understanding of complement clause constructions. In our 
study we changed the sentences used in the false belief tasks to simple sentences, such 
as “what did you first think about this box”? And “did you think about raisins or a ball 
first”? 
 What we were mainly interested in was which of the linguistic and cognitive 
skills we measured around the age of three predicted children’s false belief 
understanding half a year later. Confirming results from the correlational study 
(Brandt et al., 2016), we found that the best predictors were children’s understanding 
of complement clauses and that third person complements showed a stronger relation 
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to false belief than first person complements. To summarize, the relationship between 
complement clauses and false belief holds even when we apply strict controls. 
However, in languages like English and German, the link between complement 
clauses and false belief is moderated by an interaction with subject type. 
The question is whether we can explain this difference between first and third 
person complements and their relation to false belief based on de Villiers’ (2005) 
semantic distinction between realis and irrealis complements or whether we need to 
turn to an alternative explanation. In other words, would it be possible that the subject 
changes the semantics of mental verbs? De Villiers (2005, p. 213) does not discuss 
this issue. When she discusses the distinction between realis complements with verbs 
like think and irrealis complements with verbs like want, she states that this 
distinction is “carried by the nature of the verb”. However, it is noticeable that all of 
de Villiers’ examples are third person complements. Moreover, the training and 
longitudinal studies that found relations between complement clauses and false belief 
have either used third person complements only or a mix of second and third person 
complements. For example, in the study by Lohmann and Tomasello (2003, p. 1144), 
children in the complements training group heard sentences like the following: 
 
(3) What do you think this is? 
(4) Do you think you can light this candle? 
(5) Does Ernie know that candles can be dangerous? 
 
Sentences like these all qualify as realis complements: they refer to mental 
representations of objects in the here and now that may or may not correspond to the 
real nature of these objects1. But the same can be said about first person complements:  
 
(3a) I think this is a candle. 
(4a) I think that you can light this candle. 
 
In German, these first person complements could also be turned into irrealis 
complements by just changing the verb. In English, this change would also lead to an 
infinite complement. The irrealis complement below does not refer to a mental 
representation of an object observable at the time of speaking. 
 
 (3b) I want this to be a candle.  
 
To summarize, both first and third person complements can be realis or irrealis, 
depending on which verb types are used. Whether they are used with first or third 
person subjects has no effect on the semantics of these mental verbs. 
 If we want to explain the difference between children’s understanding of first 
and third person complements and their relation to false belief, we need to turn to 
corpus data to see how these syntactic constructions are used in actual discourse - 
outside the lab. When Thompson (2002) investigated how American-English adults 
use the most frequent complement-taking verbs (i.e., think, guess, remember, know, 
see), she found that in the vast majority of instances they used them together with a 
first person subject (e.g., “I guess he’s OK”). Based on this frequency distribution, 
she argued that complement-taking phrases like I guess or I think can be considered 
                                                 
1 Note that only some of the complements these studies contained modal verbs like can, which might 
not easily be judged as true or false. 
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fixed formulas or chunks. When she had a closer look at the discourse function of 
these fixed formulas, she suggested that most of them function as epistemic markers, 
which express speaker certainty towards a proposition. For example, when saying “I 
think the sticker is in the red box”, the speaker expresses that they are not completely 
certain whether or not “the sticker is in the red box”. If they were completely certain, 
they would say “I know the sticker is in the red box” or just “the sticker is in the red 
box”.  
 Thompson (2002) also suggested that complement clause constructions that 
contain these formulaic epistemic markers do not have the same subordinate structure 
as complement clause constructions used with less frequent third person complement-
taking phrases, such as “the boy thought”. In a prototypical subordinate structure, the 
main clause contains the foreground information and the subordinate clause contains 
background information. For example, in an utterance such as “the boy thought the 
sticker was in the red box”, the focus is typically on the thinking process. However, 
when you look at how first person complements are treated in conversation, speakers 
typically focus on what is expressed in the subordinate complement clause. This is 
nicely shown in this example (Thompson, 2002, p. 132): 
 
 (6) (talking about a photo collage on the wall) 
  Terry:  I think it’s cool. 
  Abbie:  It is cool. 
  Maureen: It is great. 
 
Here, the focus is clearly not on the thinking process, but on what is expressed in the 
complement clause “it’s cool”. Similar patterns in terms of frequency and discourse 
function of first versus third person complements have been observed in Dutch adult 
conversation (Verhagen, 2005) and, most importantly, also in the speech addressed to 
children learning German and English (Brandt, Lieven, and Tomasello, 2010; Diessel, 
2004).  
 Looking at children’s interpretation of complement clauses, children also tend 
to focus on the proposition expressed by the subordinate complement clause. As has 
been argued by Lewis, Hacquard, and Lidz (2017), children interpret these complex 
structures according to how they are most often used in child-directed speech. When 
they are asked, for example, whether a sentence like “Dora thinks that Swiper is 
behind the curtain” is correct in a scenario where the belief is false (because Swiper is 
not behind the curtain) they usually tend to say “no”. However, Lewis and colleagues 
(2017) could also show that children around the age four years are able to focus on 
the belief and judge this sentence as correct when the belief aspect is made more 
prominent by, for example, introducing a second character with a different belief. 
When we look at children’s own production of complement clause 
constructions in spontaneous speech, it is striking that they start producing these 
syntactic structures around the age of three years (e.g., Diessel, 2004), which is much 
earlier than the age at which they typically show an understanding of false belief (at 
around 4 years). However, as has been shown for other syntactic constructions (e.g., 
Bannard, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2009; Theakston & Lieven, 2017), children’s first 
complement clause constructions are mostly made up of formulaic chunks. That is, 
the vast majority of children’s early complement clause constructions are first person 
complements. And it has been argued that, just as in adult speech, these syntactic 
constructions can be analyzed as a formulaic epistemic marker used together with a 
simple proposition (Brandt et al., 2010; Diessel, 2004). In other words, most of the 
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first person complements that children and adults use in spontaneous speech do not 
have the same function and subordinate structure as the third person complements 
typically used in experimental studies looking at children’s understanding of 
complement clause structures and false belief. Whereas complement-taking phrases 
with first person subjects (e.g., “I think”) mainly function as epistemic markers, 
complement-taking phrases with third person subjects (e.g., “he thinks”) refer to a 
person’s mental process (thinking) and a mental representation (“that the sticker is in 
the red box”). This would also explain why we find that third person subjects are 
more closely related to children’s developing understanding of false belief (e.g., 
Brandt et al., 2016).  
 The last question I would like to investigate is whether the different functions 
of first and third person complements and their different relations to false belief are 
universal or whether they are affected by the way they are used in spoken discourse. 
Thompson (2002) suggests that there is a link between the frequent use and the 
epistemic function of first person complements. As has been shown for other lexical 
items and constructions, frequently used phrases often turn into chunks that cannot be 
analyzed in terms of their component parts anymore. This is also evident in discourse 
markers like “you know” in utterances like “this is great, you know”. When these 
discourse markers are used and encountered in conversation, people would rarely 
respond with “no I didn’t know that”. 
 The best test case for investigating the link between the frequent use and 
epistemic function of first person complement-taking phrases would be a language 
where mental verbs are not frequently or predominantly used with first person 
subjects. We found this to be the case in Chinese (Brandt et al., submitted). When we 
looked at Mandarin Chinese caregivers’ use of mental verbs in complement clause 
constructions, there were two important findings: First of all, the number of mental 
verbs used in Mandarin is very low compared to English and German (see also Tardif 
& Wellman, 2000). Secondly, Mandarin Chinese caregivers do not show a first person 
bias. That is, whereas English and German-speaking caregivers overwhelmingly use 
mental verbs with first person subjects, Mandarin Chinese caregivers use mental 
verbs with different kinds of subjects. For example, the frequent mental verbs jue2de2 
‘think’ and zhi1dao4 ‘know’ are most frequently used with second person singular 
subjects (58% and 54% respectively), followed by first person singular subjects (34% 
and 37%) and third person singular subjects (4% and 5%). These corpus data suggest 
that Mandarin Chinese speakers are less likely to operate with fixed formulas like ‘I 
think’ or ‘I guess’ when they use complement clause constructions. If this is the case, 
we should also expect smaller or no differences between first and third person 
complements and their relation to false belief in Chinese. 
 In order to investigate this, we replicated the study by Brandt et al. (2016) 
with Mandarin Chinese children (see Brandt et al., submitted). As a reminder, in this 
study children first did the hidden object task (Moore et al., 1989), where they heard 
contrastive statements (e.g., ‘I know that the sticker is in the blue box’ vs. ‘I think that 
the sticker is in the red box’). These statements were presented as first or third person 
complements (i.e., ‘I know…’ vs. ‘I think…’ or ‘he knows…’ vs. ‘he thinks…’). As 
reported above, we also used the explicit false belief verb ji5wai4 ‘falsely think’ in 
half of the trials. After the hidden object task, children took part in four standard false 
belief tasks.  
 We found that, as in English and German, children were better at interpreting 
third person complements than first person complements. Unlike in English and 
German, however, when we looked at the link between children’s understanding of 
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complement clauses and their understanding of false belief, we did not find a 
significant difference between first and third person complements. That is, when used 
with neutral verbs like ‘think’, neither first nor third person complements played a 
unique role in children’s false belief understanding. When used with the explicit verb 
ji5wai4 ‘falsely think’, both first and third person complements were related to false 
belief.  
 The finding that, just like English- and German-speaking children, Chinese 
children also showed a better understanding of third person complements was 
somewhat surprising. We have suggested that this might be due to task effects rather 
than linguistic usage patterns. For example, when hearing ‘I think’ and ‘I know’ 
children might need to switch perspective in order to solve the task: I should follow 
the puppet’s advice who said that ‘he knew’. This is not the case for third person 
complements where children hear ‘he thinks’ and ‘he knows’. In addition, hearing ‘he 
knows’ also means that the producer of these utterances endorses the puppet who 
‘knows’. That is, we would not say “he knows that the sticker is in the red box” if we 
had some reason to belief that the sticker was not in the red box. This might explain 
why both English and Chinese children find it easier to interpret third person 
complements – despite different usage patterns in spontaneous speech. 
 Our corpus data suggest that Chinese speakers are less likely to represent first 
person complement-taking phrases as unanalyzed chunks or discourse markers, where 
the meaning of the mental verbs is not in focus anymore. The fact that we found no 
difference in how first and third person complements are related to Chinese children’s 
false belief understanding suggests that this is indeed the case. Usage patterns can 
affect the function of different types of complement clauses. And since there is more 
equivalence in Mandarin Chinese, both first and third person complements are related 
to false belief. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
Previous research already suggested that it is difficult to disentangle the different 
linguistic factors that play a role in children’s false belief development. For example, 
de Villiers (2005) suggested that different types of verbs and their semantics affect the 
meaning of complement clauses and how they are related to false belief. A simple 
interaction between verbal semantics and syntax does not, however, explain why we 
find a difference between first and third person complements and their relation to 
false belief. Our cross-linguistic research on the use and interpretation of complement 
clause constructions in English, German, and Chinese suggests that the meaning of 
the verbs and hence the meaning of the whole construction is shaped by usage 
patterns, which differ across languages. Such a finding is, of course, not surprising 
and lends further support to linguistic theories that see syntax and semantics as 
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